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THE WORDLESS MYSTICAL AND THE 
SPIRITUALITY OF BELIEF
JEFFREY DUDIAK
In our day, at least among what passes as urbane and polite company, anything short of an enthusiastic affirmation of the full 
range of religious expression, including none, as anything other than 
the manifestation of an enriching difference, and as the enlightened 
antidote to any suggestion that some religion is true to the exclusion 
of others, means that one risks being stained with the dirtiest of 
modernist sobriquets: that of being a “fundamentalist”! In fact, 
this litmus test of liberality, dividing the drive toward acidic ethnos-
cleansing in the name of universal reason,1 on the one hand, from 
the base, parochial mythos of ein Volk, in the name of simple common 
sense, on the other, separates, from both sides, “us” against “them.” 
Anyone who has travelled widely among Friends, weaving their vine 
through our various branches, would be hard pressed to imagine that 
we do much if anything more than simply reproduce this dichotomy 
among ourselves, across which we, too, are polarized and, it seems 
to me, paralyzed—at least insofar as we might hope to think beyond 
our particular ideological boxes, insofar, that is, as we might hope to 
think.
That is, behind the “self-evident,” liberal Quaker truth that 
religious hybridity is a sign of intellectual sophistication and spiritual 
progress, as behind the contemporary version of the opposing camp 
that sees in such dalliances an infidelity to genuine, historic, Christian 
Quakerism, lies a metaphysic that is not only far from self-evident, 
but that establishes the divide around which the opposing sides rally 
precisely their opposition—and as a philosopher it is that shared 
framework, rather than the polemics issuing from either side, that 
most interests me. I have explored this phenomenon elsewhere, and in 
this brief presentation can only provide some indications and possible 
implications of it, beginning and focusing on the understandings that 
underwrite the side of the argument for which the acceptance and 
celebration of religious hybridity has become both a point of pride 
and an unchallenged tenet of faith.
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THE WORDLESS MYSTICAL
Ever since Rufus Jones brought his significant intellectual gravitas and 
lavish moustache to bear upon the Religious Society of Friends, it has 
become standard fare among liberal Friends to understand Quakerism 
as a mystical religion, even as that understanding has been virtually 
ignored by Prof. Jones’s own orthodox tradition, and rejected by 
Quaker evangelicals. As a non-originally liberal Friend (although it 
is in a liberal meeting that I now have my membership), perhaps I 
can be forgiven for never being quite sure what these Friends mean, 
positively speaking, by mysticism, or for suspecting that it does not 
quite mean the same for all. It is not that I am totally opposed to some 
holy obfuscation. In fact, I myself frequently labour to introduce a 
measure of just this when things get a little too certain, even when 
we get a little too dogmatic about our uncertainty itself—which, 
with mysticism, often appears to be the case. Indeed, the claim to 
mysticism seems most pointedly, and in practice, to play a restrictive 
role: the banishment of the definitive, that is, of definitions, at least in 
matters religious.2
This identification with mysticism is most often fleshed out across 
the traditional Quaker assertion that the real action, religiously 
speaking, transpires “beyond words,” which is accompanied by the 
idea that if the depth of mystical experience is not simply negated 
by an attempt to translate it into discursive signifiers, it at least 
exceeds them to an inexhaustible degree, rendering them inept (if 
not laughably or sadly pathetic) attempts to capture in a thought the 
reality aimed at. Faulting and finite words—human logoi—when they 
do not hinder true, “wordless” religious experience, at least fall short 
enough that if they are yet called upon to function as a crutch, even a 
necessary one, as the spiritually lame learn to walk, they must certainly 
be transcended if one is, religiously speaking, to run, and especially 
if one is to soar. In any case, on this schema mysticism is opposed 
to theo-logy, to the idea that any logoi would be adequate to that 
which is “reached” in mystical experience—for “God” too is but a 
word, even if the Word par excellence.3 Theology, then, is perceived, 
if not with disdainful condescension, then at least with sympathetic 
toleration, “if one needs that sort of thing,” provided one does not 
take it too seriously, that is, as other than a via point as opposed to 
a terminus, as an optional, and ultimately inadequate, idiolect. Of 
course, the early Friends, who translated to us moderns this ancient, 
apophatic motif, never wearied of describing their experience, and its 
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Source—and, moreover, without much ambiguity—as quite certainly 
“this rather than as that,” in broadside after broadside, pamphlet 
after pamphlet, in sermon after interminable sermon, in treatise 
after polemic, proliferating their testimony to it at a truly prodigious 
rate. So if we modern, liberal Friends yet adhere to this teaching, we 
certainly seem to understand it in a radically different way than did 
our forebears, for better or for worse.
Nevertheless, there is both some phenomenological and some 
theoretical (including theological) warrant for such an intuition, and, 
technically speaking, for the priority of intuition over interpretation 
in the affairs of the spirit.4 For example, take the very element in 
which we bathe: the air we breathe, the ground beneath our feet and 
the skies above our heads, the energies that compose and sustain us, 
and of which we ourselves dispose. The modality in which we relate 
most fundamentally to all of this is always prior to, and conditions the 
condition of possibility for, perceiving it as an object over against us, 
the latter always a derivative, and partial, relationship to that which 
first sustains us. Now, my suspicion is that for at least those whose 
spiritual sensibilities have been forged across the Abrahamic religions, 
that which exceeds definitive description is not so much a matter of 
an element from which we emerge,5 as it is a “voice” that calls us 
forth: “let there be …, and there was … .” Religious life, which on 
this model is all of life, is vocational; we are always already a response 
to a call prior to whatever attempt we might subsequently make at 
conceptualizing this lived reality, and which necessarily exceeds it 
by an essential degree, because any attempt at conceptualization is 
already implicated in it as interior to the process it would hope, après 
coup, to circumscribe.
But pushed to the extreme, that is, in converting this sensitivity 
into a principle, this framework renders concern for the theological 
(in the broad sense of anything we might “say” about the content of 
our religious experience) otiose, or at least diminishes it to the point of 
indifference. How one says things, if one need say anything at all, does 
not matter. One does not, at least insofar as one transposes oneself 
down to the level of the truly fundamental, hear the words, which serve 
merely an auxiliary function in any case, but “feel where the words 
come from,”6 which is what counts, after all, even if no specification 
can be given of that “where” without lapsing into precisely what is 
to be avoided. The result is that we are left speaking as vaguely and 
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elusively with each other as possible—which usually means speaking 
about something else.7 This is the new basis of our (religious?) society, 
then, that struggles not to give collective articulation to our religious 
experience, but unites around our principled refusal to do so.
Such a schema, of course, opens the field to all comers. One is 
encouraged to be “open to new light, from whatever source it may 
come,”8 welcomed to draw on other traditions—religious, spiritual, 
pagan, secular—to supplement, and even transform, the Quaker way, 
provided, of course, that any beliefs articulated across such borrowings 
are taken as conduits for spiritual exploration and edification, and do 
not transgress the prohibition against claims to trans-personal truth. 
So, let them all come!: Hindu-Quakers, Jewish-Quakers, Wicca-
Quakers, non-theist-Quakers, and whatever else one fancies, to join 
the now also hyphenated older-order liberal-Quakers, Orthodox-
Quakers, Evangelical-Quakers, and Conservative-Quakers.
THE SPIRITUALITY OF BELIEF
And, yet, one is perhaps not being simply flippant in wondering 
whether this phenomenon testifies to the healthy expansiveness of 
Quaker spirituality, or, as we stock our spiritual pantry with borrowed 
victuals, to the poverty of contemporary, Quaker religious life. Might 
a richer engagement with our own religious tradition provide a 
depth that the currently practiced, stripped-down version—open to 
everything because committed to nothing but openness itself—simply 
cannot?
One wonders, also, along with Derek Guiton in his recent, 
controversial book (which, more often than we are comfortable with, 
speaks truth to the power of our “liberal orthodoxy”), whether, 
despite the liberal Quaker creed that “all we are doing is using 
different language to refer to the same thing, … it is obvious that we 
are using the same language to refer to different things.”9 That is, is 
the mantra that we are all saying the same thing, despite a plethora 
of incommensurable assertions, not rather a dogmatic assertion that 
blinds us to the reality that this claim itself is a matter of religious 
belief, in fact the imposition of a master-belief that enforces one 
particular version of religious metaphysics, a version that henceforth 
governs acceptable and unacceptable forms and modes of religious 
expression under the benign banner of “toleration:” for the “belief” 
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that the essential is beyond words, across the shape given to mysticism 
in modernity, henceforth organizes and polices the entire religious 
landscape of contemporary (liberal) Friends. Could it be that our 
supposed unity is in fact illusory, and unachievable on the non-terms 
across which it is confessed, unless it is imposed?
In contrast to this heretical orthodoxy, I would like to entertain 
the possibility that beliefs do matter, and this because, hermeneutically 
considered, we not only give formation to our traditions, but are 
formed by them, across what H.-G. Gadamer refers to (in one of 
the least musical of phrases in one of the least musical of languages) 
as wirkungsgeschichtlishe Bewusstsein, or the “historical formation of 
consciousness.” To belong to a religious tradition is to participate in 
a trajectory of response to a call that, while always open to critique 
and expansion and innovation, has among its functions the ongoing 
articulation of that call itself in creative continuity with the tradition in 
question—the dialectic between creativity and continuity constituting 
the living spirit of that particular tradition qua tradition.10 This 
circularity between our traditions and our experience of “the divine” 
or “God” or “the Spirit” or “the Life Force” or what have you (as 
there is no neutral, non-tradition-bound articulation of “that which 
calls”11), each conditioning the other, is I think a better description 
of a living spirituality than is the static (and I suspect illusory) 
phenomenon that we have an immediate connection to the divine, if 
that is taken to mean one that is neither nourished by, nor demands, 
articulation.
Neither I nor you, I suspect, want to be counted among those 
“closed-minded, sticks-up-their-butts” who balk at the welcoming of 
one and all into the Quaker fold. And there is no question that the 
liberalizing, universalizing tendency among this particular caste of 
contemporary Friends has yielded some very good fruit. But, short of 
swallowing whole the metaphysic entailed by the modernist reading 
of mysticism, it is not self-evident that every attempt at hyphenation 
will succeed in enriching the Quaker trajectory. If conservatives tend 
to too readily shy away from innovation out of fear of losing what they 
have got, liberals tend to be too quick to adopt the new, mindless of 
what of worth is being left behind. Indeed, the debate over whether 
hybridity evinces the maturation of Quakerism or its degeneracy is 
among the most crucial in our generation, and we should perhaps be 
mindful of reflexively allowing this question to be approached in such 
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dichotomous, either-or, terms. For myself, I am still trying to discern 
the meaning of our hybridity, and the underlying structures against 
which we might understand and evaluate it.
ENDNOTES
 1. The reason why this trajectory can accommodate every and all religious expression (up 
to a point!) is that in each case such expressions are permitted only insofar as they are 
“reasonable,” i.e., subject to a purportedly universal Reason, and thus “domesticated” 
(i.e., largely privatized). The use of the term “fundamentalism” is an intimidation tactic 
employed by us liberals to label and isolate any religious expression that refuses to be 
brought to heel, that refuses to bow down before the true God: human Reason.
 2. This is why non-theist (as opposed to agnostic) Friends are not really liberals in this 
sense; for them the non-existence of God is quite certain.
 3. Emmanuel Levinas has provocatively denominated the name/word “God” (i.e., “the 
admission of the stronger than me and in me”) as “the apex of vocabulary.” Emmanuel 
Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. A. Lingis (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1981), 156.
 4. In hermeneutic terms, “intuition” names an immediate relationship with that to which 
I relate, suggesting direct access, whereas “interpretation” names a mediated relation-
ship, enacted across something else—language, for example.
 5. As tends to be the case, at least across a rough and ready characterization, for “pagan” 
religions.
 6. John Woolman, in his Journal, records these often quoted words by a native American 
chief who asked that Woolman’s address not be translated, for, as Papunchang said: “I 
love to feel where the words come from.”
 7. The alibi of not taking religious expression seriously results in the phenomenon of not 
taking religion seriously, and for our placing our focus elsewhere, perhaps in social work, 
activism, or politics. However, it is not clear that Quakers can continue to make unique 
contributions even in these areas if they are severed from the religious sensitivities that 
birthed those concerns and gave shape to often quite distinctive, Quakerly approaches 
to them.
 8. This frequently quoted phrase is drawn from Quaker Faith & Practice: The book of 
Christian discipline of the Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in 
Britain (London: Britain Yearly Meeting, 4th ed., 2009), Advice number 7. Interestingly, 
the following line—“Do you approach new ideas with discernment?”—is almost never 
quoted along with it.
 9. Derek Guiton, A Man that Looks on Glass (Milton Keynes: FeedARead Publishing, 
2015), p. 6.
10 . One of the most important aspects of engaging a tradition is that it provides the possibil-
ity of an “other” perspective that can call into critical question contemporary assumptions. 
Without this broader perspective, without a deep respect for traditions, we are more 
blindly enslaved to present prejudices than we might otherwise be. If on the one side (the 
orthodox), we Quakers have forgotten our tradition’s suspicion of religious traditions and 
have too readily sought to ground ourselves in them in an uncritical way, on the other 
(liberal) side we have too often employed our tradition’s suspicion of religious traditions 
as an excuse to jettison anything in the tradition that does not “speak to our condition” as 
thoroughgoing “moderns”—often impoverishing ourselves in the process.
11. Indeed, our preference for one or another of these terms, and our allergy to others, is 
itself a product of our experience of, and engagement with, our traditions.
